Spatial and Temporal Modeling of Community Non-Timber Forest Extraction by Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson et al.




Spatial and Temporal Modeling of Community Non-
Timber Forest Extraction 
 





*Research Associate, Centre for the study of African Economies, University of Oxford 
e-mail: ejzrobinson@hotmail.com 
 
**Department of Forest Resources, Oregon State University 
e-mail: jo.albers@oregonstate.edu 
 





Elizabeth J Z Robinson 
Mailing address: 
P O Box 9011 
Dar es Salaam 
Tanzania  
+255 (0)741 355700 
 
 
    2 
Spatial and Temporal Modeling of Community Non-
Timber Forest Extraction 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the interaction of spatial and dynamic aspects of resource 
extraction from forests by local people.  Highly cyclical and varied across both space and 
time, the patterns of resource extraction resulting from the spatial-temporal model bear little 
resemblance to the patterns drawn from focusing either on spatial or temporal aspects of 
extraction, as is typical in both the modeling and empirical literature to date. Combining the 
spatial-temporal model with a measure of success in community forest management￿the 
ability to avoid open-access resource degradation￿characterizes the impact of incomplete 
property rights on patterns of resource extraction and stocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Extraction of products such as fuelwood and foods from community and government 
forests makes a significant contribution to rural people￿s welfare in many poor countries 
(Cavendish, 2000; Mahapatra, Albers, and Robinson, 2005; Bahuguna, 2000). Villagers 
make decisions about where, when, and how much to extract from forests based on resource 
quality, costs of extraction, and rules of access. Over time this extraction may cause 
degradation, which can in turn limit the forest￿s ability to provide environmental services, 
timber, and the extracted resources themselves. The interaction of spatial and temporal 
aspects of extraction decisions and the relationship between those decisions and the strength 
of local community resource management institutions (CRMI) determine the levels of rural 
welfare and forest resource stocks over time and space. 
By analyzing a model that explicitly accounts for both spatial and temporal components 
of resource extraction￿instead of focusing on one or the other￿and incorporating the role 
of CRMIs, this paper predicts some previously unanticipated outcomes.
1 First, the spatial 
nature of extraction results in a dynamic extraction path that is cyclical￿comprising 
multiple periods across which extraction quantities vary considerably￿rather than smooth 
as predicted by purely dynamic non-spatial analysis. Second, the spatial pattern of 
extraction varies markedly across time￿comprising patterns of high levels of extraction 
near the village in some periods and high levels of extraction away from the village in other 
periods￿rather than the pattern of monotonically decreasing extraction over distance from 
the village predicted by purely spatial non-dynamic analysis. Third, management 
institutions that are not 100 percent effective can generate the bulk of both extraction value 
                                                         
1   Some ecological models demonstrate variability across time and space, which implies that 
￿understanding environmental change involves looking beyond natural-resource depletion and 
degradation in the aggregate￿ (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones; 1999; p. 226, para 3) and toward 
ecological and human processes across both space and time.    4 
and resource stock size.  Fourth, both the net present value of the extracted resource and the 
pattern of forest degradation are a function of the spatial distribution of the effectiveness of 
management institutions.  Fifth, because the spatial pattern of the degree of effectiveness of 
management institutions interacts with the spatial aspects of extraction, a uniform 
distribution of management effort across locations is inefficient. Sixth, stock management 
policies such as ￿enriching￿ an area with certain species can have positive or adverse effects 
on stock sizes in other areas. Hence, this more integrated approach points to the pitfalls of 
focusing on a subset of the issues and identifies priorities for setting policy. 
1.1 Literature 
In taking an explicitly temporal and spatial approach to analyzing resource extraction, 
this paper brings together three typically separate strands of literature on forest degradation 
in poor countries: dynamic implications of resource extraction; spatial and distance 
dimensions of extraction; and the impact of community resource management institutions 
(CRMI) on extraction patterns and degradation.  Because these three aspects of resource 
extraction interact in practice, the integrated model developed here provides useful insights 
for policy that are unlikely to come from any of the individual strands of research.   
Research and policy have long incorporated a central characteristic of forests: they 
regenerate.  The dynamic aspects of resource extraction involve balancing the level of 
extraction with the resource￿s growth rate to prevent excessive degradation, and have been 
widely addressed for many resources.  For example, Clarke, Reed, and Shrestha (1993) and 
Bluffstone (1995) explore the time path of resource stocks in the setting of resource    5 
extraction in poor countries.  Bluffstone (1995) pays particular attention to the role of the 
labor market in determining extraction paths.  
Forest management policies are increasingly spatial; for example, governments 
typically create buffer zones for extraction between villages and parks to address the dual 
needs of rural people and resource protection (Wells and Brandon, 1992).  Spatial aspects of 
resource extraction decisions matter because the configuration and quality of the resource 
stocks influence both villager welfare and the provision of ecosystem services, such as 
watershed protection, maintenance of biodiversity, or creation of recreation opportunities 
(Heltberg, 2001; Wu and Boggess, 1999; Albers, 1996; Shaefer, 1990; Diamond, 1975).  
These spatial aspects have been acknowledged, if not explicitly modeled, by various 
empirical studies that identify the distance to extraction sites as an important determinant of 
the labor time cost of extraction (Pattanayak, Sills, and Kramer, 2004; Kohlin and Parks, 
2001; Amacher, Hyde, and Kanel, 1996).  Kohlin and Parks (2001) develop a model of 
fuelwood extraction and an econometric analysis that demonstrates that ￿the collection 
decision depends on the relative returns from different sources of fuel ￿ [and] that distance 
to the forest is a crucial factor￿ (p. 214).  MacDonald, Adamowicz, and Luckert (2001) use 
a site choice model for fuelwood collection in which distance and trip difficulty contribute 
to costs of extraction and explore the impact of collection location on extraction and 
welfare.  Heltberg (2001) uses a spatial measure￿forest use penetration￿to describe forest 
degradation. Robinson, Williams, and Albers (2002) use a household labor allocation model 
to demonstrate how access to markets alters the spatial profile of resource stocks in a forest.  
Yet even with these articles and the abundance of econometric evidence about the role of 
distance and time in extraction decisions, relatively little research exists that explicitly 
models the spatial aspects of forest resource extraction decisions.    6 
A growing spatially explicit economic literature examines the issue of land use change 
in the tropics ￿ particularly patterns of forest clearing (Chomitz and Gray, 1996; Nelson and 
Hellerstein, 1997).  Much of that literature uses a von Thunen-style land rent model and 
econometric analysis to explain the location of deforestation.  Only recently has that 
literature begun to include both location/spatial and temporal aspects of land use decisions 
(Vance and Geoghegan, 2002; Munroe, Southworth, and Tucker, 2002).  Vance and 
Geoghegan (2002; p.317) argue that ￿de-coupling of spatial and temporal dimensions 
compromises the implementation of appropriate policy response￿ for deforestation.  
Sanchirico and Wilen (1999 and 2005) make a similar argument for the coupling of spatial 
and temporal dimensions for analysis of fisheries, because the fish can and do move, and 
not necessarily evenly across space and time. The model and analysis presented here for 
forests link the spatial and temporal dimensions through the relatively free but uneven 
movement of the human extractors. 
Economic theory, emphasizing the role of dynamic externalities, predicts that, whether 
by an individual or community, sole ownership generates higher net present value and forest 
stocks than open access. As Hardin (1968) demonstrated, if a resource is open access, 
individual extractors do not fully incorporate the dynamic cost in terms of resource growth 
associated with current extraction and the resource is overexploited. In rural areas of poor 
countries, different property rights regimes are found, with differing levels of effectiveness. 
Many forests are subject to open access extraction even if, as commonly occurs, the 
government has the property right for that forest, because property rights are difficult and 
costly to enforce (Robinson, 2004; Larson and Bromley, 1990; White and Martin, 2002).  
Many forests￿including many government forests￿are managed as common property by 
village institutions (Heltberg, 2001; Ostrom, 1990); indeed, many NGOs and governments 
have policies to support or generate such institutions in order to raise welfare and resource    7 
stocks (Edmonds, 2002; Ligon and Narain, 1999).  These institutions have had varying 
degrees of success. Some communities manage the resource in a manner that closely 
mimics the management strategy of a sole-owner, internalizing dynamic externalities, but 
others range across a continuum from open access to fully private (Schlager and Ostrom, 
1992; McCarthy, Sadoulet, and de Janvry, 2001; Gibson, Lehouq, and Williams, 2002; 
Alix-Garcia, 2005).  Further, partly in response to patterns of forest degradation and 
concern for the well-being of rural people, many countries have devolved resource 
management to the local level, giving rural communities defined rights to extraction from 
forests (Edmonds, 2002; Albers, Rozelle, and Guo, 1998).   
From a modeling perspective, it is not clear that these improved but imperfect property 
rights should be represented as either the extreme of perfect rights nor the extreme of no 
rights whatsoever. Some intermediate range seems a better representation. Similarly, it is 
not clear that community resource management institutions are equally effective by space. 
A spatial-temporal model of property rights seems appropriate, in other words. 
 
2. Model of extraction 
This model of resource extraction incorporates three critical characteristics of rural 
resource extraction in poor countries: forest regrowth and trade-offs across time; spatial 
extraction decisions that incorporate distance costs; and the strength of community resource 
management institutions (CRMIs) over time. Three key equations characterize the model: a 
harvest function that links effort and resource stock levels to the amount extracted in a 
particular location; a cost function that is a function of the time spent extracting, the 
distanced traversed within the forest, and the amount of resource that is carried home; and a 
resource growth function that is the equation of motion linking periods. To solve the model,    8 
the community￿s objective function is defined, as is the nature of property rights. 
Equilibrium patterns of extraction over time and space are then determined as a function of 
the extent to which property rights are enforced over time. The model is discrete in time 
over a finite but effectively infinite number of periods and discrete in space over a finite 
area of land.
2 
2.1 Extraction function 
Each period, s, the community￿s villagers enter the forest to extract a particular 
resource that is located in N discrete equidistant clusters perpendicular to the forest 
boundary (cluster i=1 is nearest to the village and cluster i=N located farthest into the 
forest). There is a nearby market where the resource can be bought and sold for a price p . 
The community chooses how much to harvest,  s i h , , each period s, in each cluster i , i  = 1 
through  s n , where  s n  is the furthest cluster that the villager extracts from in period s. The 
individual cluster harvest,  s i h , , is a function of  s i w , , the time spent extracting in cluster i; 
s i m , , the cluster￿s resource density at the start of the period; M  the maximum carrying 
capacity of each cluster; and α , a parameter that represents, for example, the ease of 
harvesting per unit of effort. The harvest function exhibits the key characteristics of 
extraction, in particular diminishing returns to time spent extracting in any one particular 
cluster: 
                                                         
2   In practice, the resource could either be continuously distributed throughout the forest, such as 
grass or twigs, or located in discrete clusters, such as bamboo or mushrooms. Because villagers turn 
around at some location, even after just one period of extraction the distribution of the resource 
becomes discontinuous at that point, even if the resource distribution was initially continuous. The 
assumption of a continuously distributed resource therefore devolves very quickly into a discrete 
distribution. The choice of a continuous or discrete resource therefore does not change the problem 
fundamentally. Albers (1998) and Robinson et al. (1999) provide more detailed exploration of 
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2.2 Cost function  
Extraction is costly, both in terms of the time spent extracting from each cluster,  s i w , , 
and the time taken to go from one cluster to another both going into and out of the forest. 
The time taken to traverse the forest between clusters of the resource is an increasing 
function of the amount of resource already harvested and being carried by the villager ￿ that 
is, people slow down the greater the weight of the extracted resource, and hence they walk 
into the forest without a load and extract on the way out.
3 The total time spent in the forest 
in period s is written: 
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The cost of this extraction is equal to  s cT , where cis the opportunity cost of labor per 
unit time. 
The first term on the right hand side is the time it takes for a villager to go into the 
forest to the furthest cluster from which she will extract in that period, where v is the time it 
takes to walk between two adjacent clusters without a load. The second term is the time it 
takes to walk between clusters with a load on the way out of the forest, where s i H ,  is the 
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3 Alternatively, the cost function could reflect an increasing opportunity cost of time over time (see, 
for example, Robinson et al, 2002). The functional form used in this paper is appropriate for a 
situation in which there is no uncertainty as to the location of the resource.    10 
(γ >0) and θ  (θ >1) determine how the weight of the load affects the villager ￿ the larger γ  
the greater the sensitivity of traverse speed to the load carried, and the larger θ  the more 
non linear the relationship between the load weight and speed of walking.
4 The third term is 
the total time spent extracting in each of the clusters 1 through  s n . Harvesting efficiency is 
not affected by how much the villager has already collected.  The clusters are linked 
spatially through this cost function. 
2.3 Equation of motion 
The extracted product displays the typical characteristic of a renewable resource in that 
it regenerates according to a logistic growth function that provides the link ￿ or equation of 
motion ￿ across periods.  The growth of the resource in plot i between the end of harvesting 
period s and the beginning of harvesting period s+1,  s i g , , is a function of the resource level 
and harvest in the previous period, the natural growth rate r of the resource, and the 
maximum carrying capacity, M: 
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According to Equation 3, the regrowth in any one plot is solely a function of the 
biomass in that plot. There is no spatial dispersal of the biomass, as in the application to 
￿patchy￿ fisheries by Sanchirico and Wilen (1999 and 2005). The model of resource 
extraction presented here is the antithesis of the bioeconomic situation emphasized by 
                                                         
4   Once a model recognizes that distance itself imposes a cost, without some non-linearity in the 
cost function, the extractor would not turn around until she reached the end of the forest. Further, 
whether a discrete or continuous space model is used, the spatial aspect of the model also means that 
the cost function must take account of both the time it takes to traverse the forest and the time it 
takes to extract from each cluster.    11 
Sanchirico and Wilen, in that the spatial connections come solely through human extraction, 
especially through the linear arrangement of the plots. Moreover, the human extractors are 
forward looking, which matters in all situations except for the extreme of open access with 
no pre-commitment of harvesting effort. Because most actual situations, whether in forests 
or in the sea, involve some pre-commitment, some incomplete property rights, and some 
biological dispersal, the two models complement each other. 
 
3. Equilibrium transition path and steady-state patterns of extraction  
The community resource management institution, acting as a social planner, allocates 
temporal extraction rights to a large number of identical villagers, residing adjacent to an 
area of forest, so as to maximize the net present value of net returns to extraction, V.
5 The 
choice variables are the quantities extracted from each cluster each period,  s i h , , and 
therefore how far into the forest villagers go each period. The discount rate is written ρ , 
where  ( ) ρ β + = 1 1 , and the net returns in period s are written  s R . The community￿s 
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Subject to Equations 1,2, and 3. 
                                                         
5   Although in practice, in some cases, individuals are permitted to live within a government 
forest, this paper assumes that the government successfully excludes people from dwelling in the 
forest.  Hence people live adjacent to, and not within, the forest. Such an approach emphasizes how 
distance from a villager￿s home to an extractable resource influences the pattern of extraction. In 
addition, the assumption that villagers reside outside the forest is especially pertinent if de facto 
buffer zones within a forest or protected area are recognized (for example: Hall and Rodgers, 1992).    12 
To solve the model for the amount extracted in each cluster in each period, the property 
rights regime ￿ that is the institutional setting ￿ must be specified.  i φ  is a parameter that 
augments the discount rate, and is introduced to represent the community resource 
management institution￿s effectiveness in managing the resource over time in a particular 
cluster ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ i φ ).  i φ=1 represents fully effective CRMI and hence optimal extraction that 
results from fully considering the future in current decisions.  i φ =0 represents a complete 
breakdown of the CRMI or open access, modeled as equivalent to period-by-period myopic 
extraction in which the extractors fail to consider the future in current extraction decisions.
6 
Hence, a parametric reduction of  i φ  represents weakening of the effectiveness of the CRMI. 
i φ  can also be interpreted as the confidence that the community has over whether it will 
have extraction rights in the next period ￿ that is, uncertainty of property rights, the level of 
cooperation among villagers, or the level of activity by ￿outsiders￿ who ignore the 
management institution￿s rules. Perhaps next period the villagers will lose rights to harvest 
from a particular cluster in the forest, or perhaps from that period future rights will weaken. 
Perhaps next period rights will strengthen, and if they strengthen in one cluster, they may 
weaken on another. Hence, the proper solution of the full stochastic dynamic programming 
problem will be equivalent to some current discount on the certain future, namely i φ . What 
degree and pattern of future uncertainty corresponds to the certain  i φ need not be a concern 
from the modeling perspective. Further, whereas most existing models consider either 
perfect property rights or no property rights, the single parameter  i φ  is a simple way to 
represent in addition the range in between. 
                                                         
6 Alix-Garcia (2004) uses a similar parameter to denote the ￿different qualities of collective action, 
ranging from a social planner [￿] to a tragedy of the commons situation.￿ (page 12, paragraph 2)  
Similarly, Ligon and Narain (1999) depict the degree to which a group can design institutions and 
enforce rules for controlling fuelwood collection from government land.  This paper￿s model 
structure implies that φ  depicts the ability to internalize the time-based externality associated with 
extracting a growing resource.    13 
From both a mathematical perspective and a behavioral effect,  i φ  is similar to a tax on 
capital.  i φ  less than 1, that is, incomplete property rights, favors more current exploitation 
of the resource rather than saving it for later exploitation. As does a tax on capital, the 
influence of poor property rights compounds over many periods. That is, from the 
perspective of the decisions in the current period,  i φ  less than 1 distorts the tradeoff 
between current exploitation and savings but the value of any savings is further depressed 
by the distortion next period between exploitation then and further savings, and so on into 
the future. 
Conceptually this dynamic optimization problem can be solved by writing the discrete 
time Bellman equation, in which the returns to extraction are decomposed into the returns to 
extraction in the current period and the returns to extraction in all future periods, then 
formulating the Euler equations, which provide the first order conditions for the villager￿s 
equilibrium behavior. However, because of the complexity of temporal-spatial models, even 
using the simplest of equations, analytical solutions would not be satisfactory for describing 
the equilibrium. The use of calibration and numerical simulations to solve the above system 
of equations confirmed that, though the model equations are relatively simple individually, 
they combine to produce a complex non-linear system in which the equilibrium is multi-
period and cyclical, the number of periods in the equilibrium being endogenous to the 
model parameterization and calibration. Euler conditions cannot provide a sense of such an 
equilibrium. Nor can Euler conditions give any clues as to the transition to the steady state 
and whether the transition is important. 
The Euler conditions, even in the abstract, can, however, give insights into how the 
model can be solved. Even though the community’s optimization involves many periods ￿ s 
could even be infinity ￿ in practice the optimization requires a sequence of two-period 
comparisons. The selection of the optimal amount to harvest involves the comparison of    14 
harvesting in the current period versus saving the resource for the next period, at which time 
there is a similar decision. Given an appropriate function to represent the value of the 
resource bequeathed to the next period, the optimization reduces to the amounts to harvest 
in a single period, which is a much easier problem for the community (and indeed for the 
analyst). The problem is not simplistic, nonetheless. The discreteness of the clusters and the 
fixed costs to traveling the intervening distances between clusters together create 
complications such that numerical methods are required to solve the model.  
For solving dynamic problems numerically, the common technique is the backwards 
induction at the heart of dynamic programming. Some value function is presumed for some 
distant period s, and the numerical algorithm works backwards through period s-1, s-2 to 
period 2, to period 1, the initial period. Earlier periods thus take into account later periods. 
For certainty models, the sequence can proceed in the other direction, from the present to 
the future, provided some function represents the future.
7 If that function proves to imply 
itself, the dynamic path has been determined (by the analyst). That function can be updated 
through broader iterations, until the solution stabilizes.
8 That function exists even when 
φ =0, because there is some value to savings even when the community does not consider 
that value. 
For solving spatial problems numerically, the common technique is creation of a 
conjectured social planner maximizing supposed social surplus. The solution to that 
                                                         
7   What matters in practice is the marginal value function, not the value function. The numerical 
method used in this analysis deduces the marginal value function by considering what 0.1 more unit 
would be worth to the next period, cluster by cluster by cluster. The marginal value function is the 
numerical technique developed for dynamic spatial problems in Williams and Wright (1991), 
Chapters 9 and 10. 
8   In the present application, fifteen of these broader iterations were used, as well as ninety 
periods. Those choices seem to have little affect on the solutions, given that the longest cycle found 
for the parameters used appeared to be twelve periods, but there could be longer cycles not 
uncovered. The fixed costs influence the computations in many ways.    15 
maximization problem will have first order conditions, ones equivalent to no arbitrage 
opportunities existing in equilibrium. Those first order conditions, which will typically be 
discontinuous and numerically unstable, are not easy to solve simultaneously. In the setting 
at hand, the numerical technique can be further refined, taking advantage of the arrangement 
of clusters along a line. The numerical technique computes in sequence the net gains from 
extraction by distance, including no distance at all, selecting the highest value rather than 
looking for a particular marginal condition. 
To solve the model, an initial resource profile is stipulated, a transition phase from the 
starting conditions to the equilibrium is included, and an equilibrium is postulated which 
comprises q periods. Explicit functional forms are chosen, and the model solved 
numerically. Without costs to travel between clusters, the solution is easy to find 
numerically, being a simple rate of harvesting that repeats period after period (that rate 
differing to the extent the future is considered). With fixed costs of travel, the steady state 
cycles. Experimentation with different calibrations revealed that the equilibrium is highly 
sensitive, particularly in terms of the number of periods that constitute the steady-state long-
run equilibrium. The results that are shown should therefore be considered illustrative of 
different features of the model. Indeed, the very sensitivity of the model to the calibration is 
an interesting result in itself.    16 
4. Spatial and temporal patterns of extraction, stock size, and net present value 
 4.1. Spatially constant institutional effectiveness (φ  constant across clusters) 
Case 1:Perfectly Effective Community Resource Management Institution (φ =1)  
When φ =1 for all clusters,  p ps = , and the forest is initially pristine ( M mi = 1 ,  for all 
i), the per-period extraction and the remaining resource in both the transition path and 
equilibrium for the five clusters closest to the village are as shown in Figure 1.
9   The 
characteristics of both the transition phase and equilibrium are very different from those that 
would be predicted by a non-spatial unconstrained dynamic optimization model. The 
transition path, rather than being a single period (such as is found in Clarke, Reed, and 
Shrestha, 1993), comprises ten periods, five with unique positive levels of extraction 
alternating with five of zero extraction.
10 The equilibrium is indeed cyclical, with extraction 
varying over space and time.  It comprises a repeating pattern of twelve periods, again with 
no extraction in alternate periods.
11 In any particular period of the equilibrium, marginal net 
returns to extraction are equal across those clusters where extraction occurs.
12 Across 
periods, because villagers have fully effective spatial and temporal property rights, they 
                                                         
9   For the chosen calibration (α =0.9, γ =0.03, θ =1.7, v=1.0, ρ =0.1, c=4.0, p=7.0, 
r=0.7)villagers never enter more than the first five clusters, hence there is no need to show more 
than five clusters in the figures. 
10 This model has not specified the time period represented by each period. Indeed, the relationship 
between extraction and regeneration will depend on how often the product is harvested relative to its 
natural growth rate. For example, a small amount of fuelwood typically is harvested daily or weekly 
and constant but gradual regeneration occurs. Fish are often harvested seasonally, with regeneration 
of the stocks occurring annually. The transition periods to a steady state could therefore be weeks, 
years, or decades, depending on the specific resource. 
11 Zero extraction in alternate periods occurs in part because the villager must travel some distance 
even to reach the cluster closest to the village.  In addition, this model views communities as being 
able to make tradeoffs across time without per-period subsistence constraints.   
12   Marginal net returns are not equal across all clusters because of the transactions costs of moving 
from one cluster to another, and the consequent zero extraction in some clusters.    17 
choose between harvesting in the current period and permitting the resource to regenerate in 
anticipation of future payoffs. That is, villagers choose between extracting (taking a 
￿dividend￿), and allowing the resource to regenerate further (￿asset growth￿). Hence, where 
extraction occurs, the marginal benefits across time are also equal. Not surprisingly, as is 
found in non-spatial models, harvesting rents remain at the end of the period because the 
community is able to enforce its management rules over space and time and ensure that no 
cheating by villagers or outsiders occurs while the resource regenerates.  
The further the cluster is from the village, the more costly it is to reach it, and hence the 
more cost effective it is to let the resource regenerate for several periods.  Once the cluster￿s 
resource has regenerated, extraction merits incurring the relatively high transportation cost.  
More distant clusters are therefore harvested less frequently but more intensively per 
extraction period.  For example, for the given calibration, in periods 1, 5, and 9 of the 
equilibrium, extraction occurs in the first four clusters, in period 3, in the first three clusters, 
and in periods 7 and 11, in just the first two clusters.  Further, because it is costly to move 
from cluster to cluster in the forest, the cost of distance ￿protects￿ clusters 5 onwards from 
extraction and hence degradation, both in the transition phase and in the equilibrium cycle 
(hence the figures only show clusters one through five).   
The decision to extract in distant clusters is influenced by the resource densities in 
clusters close to the village. Intuitively, if the clusters closer to the village are completely 
degraded, transportation costs are incurred reaching the distant clusters but no revenue can 
be generated en route back home. In comparison, if the villager can also extract while 
returning from the distant clusters, then the effective cost of reaching the distant clusters is 
reduced.     18 
Case 2: Completely ineffective community management (φ=0)  
At the other extreme, if CRMI breaks down completely (φ =0), the transition is also ten 
periods but the equilibrium is a six-period cycle, again with extraction only occurring in 
alternate periods.
13 In equilibrium, villagers extract from clusters 1 through 4 in periods 1 
and 3, and from clusters 1 through 3 in period 5 of the equilibrium cycle (Figure 2).  
Unlike the full property rights case above, villagers enter cluster 5 in the second period 
of the transition phase, but do not enter this cluster in the equilibrium cycle. That is, cluster 
5 is degraded during the transition phase, yet is ￿protected￿ for all future periods from 
extraction in later periods by a combination of distance and degradation in near clusters, 
even when the resource in cluster 5 is fully regenerated.  This finding ￿ that a cluster further 
into the forest can be degraded when the near-village clusters are less degraded, but 
protected when more degradation occurs in the near-village clusters ￿ suggests that efforts 
to enhance a buffer zone, for example to benefit local residents, might have the 
unanticipated effect of encouraging villagers further into the forest (into cluster 5 in the 
model) when community management is less effective, but not with more effective 
management. An analysis only of the equilibrium would not reveal this extraction behavior 
because it only occurs during transition. Although in this model the extracted resource is 
renewable and so eventually regenerates fully in cluster 5, it is quite possible in cases with 
other resource regeneration functions￿such as those that contain thresholds￿that, during 
the transition phase, villagers could cause irreversible damage to other resources that are 
located in cluster 5. This finding suggests that additional protection of inner, more pristine 
areas of forest might be required when the outer areas are less degraded.  
                                                         
13   That the transition phase is the same length as for effective community management is simply 
coincidence.    19 
Figure 3 provides summary comparisons of the equilibrium cycles for effective and 
ineffective community management.  The difference in average stock sizes reflects the 
typical anticipated differences between open access and efficient management.  In 
equilibrium the average amount harvested from each cluster is similar, however, the average 
stock size remaining under fully effective management is much greater than under 
ineffective management, because less extraction occurs during the transition phase. 
Effective community resource management therefore results in more extraction, higher net 
profits, and greater remaining resource than in the ineffective resource management 
institution case. These results are not surprising. 
Perhaps less intuitive is that the two extreme cases of institutional effectiveness differ 
significantly in the time path of extraction. When the CRMI is fully effective (φ =1), the 
resource profile varies considerably over time, consistent with ￿sophisticated￿ extraction. 
Villagers choose to specialize, focusing their extraction each period on fewer clusters and 
permitting clusters to recover for several periods without extraction. Although the 
maximum stock￿the highest stock size attained over the equilibrium cycle￿increases with 
distance from the village, the minimum stock size￿the lowest stock size observed over the 
equilibrium cycle￿does not follow a linear pattern with distance from the village, being 
greatest in clusters one and four with clusters 2 and 3 experiencing the most degradation.   
In contrast, when a CRMI is ineffective (φ =0), villagers tend to extract relatively 
evenly from each cluster across time, resulting in smoother spatial profile of extraction and 
remaining resource stock. As for the φ =0 case, the distance cost generates a spatial pattern 
of resource stocks in which the maximum stock increases with distance from the village.  
However, in contrast, the minimum stock also increases monotonically with distance from 
the village.       20 
Parametric variation of management effectiveness 
Many research papers and policy discussions call for the improvement of community 
resource management institutions both to improve welfare and to avoid the ￿tragedy of the 
commons￿ of eroding resource stocks and values.  For example, McCarthy, Sadoulet, and 
de Janvry (2001; p.308) argue that ￿the quality of cooperation will improve with policy 
interventions that help reduce the variable costs of cooperation￿.  In this section, parametric 
variation of φ  demonstrates that many of the benefits of well-functioning resource 
management institutions can be attained at levels of effectiveness that are somewhat lower 
than would be expected from a linear interpolation between the extremes of effectiveness, 
open access and perfectly efficient. 
As is typical and to be expected, villager welfare decreases as φ  becomes smaller. This 
decline in net present value indicates the degree of costliness of the ￿tragedy of the 
commons￿ at different levels of CRMI effectiveness. That is, the more effective is the 
CRMI in avoiding inter-temporal open access, the greater the returns to resource extraction.  
However, the relationship between φ  and welfare is non-linear. For example, for the given 
calibration, the fully ineffective CRMI generates 64 percent of the village welfare benefits 
of the perfectly effective CRMI, and to receive 95 percent of the effective institution￿s 
NPV, the institution need only have an effectiveness of φ =0.72.  The model therefore 
suggests that NGOs, villages, and governments that seek to improve rural welfare by 
supporting CRMI can achieve much of their goal without perfectly effective institutions.
14 
                                                         
14   For example, a village may include a group of extractors who are not willing to cooperate with 
CRMI rules or may face difficulties in excluding some outsiders.  These results show that the 
cooperating villagers may be able to create a strong enough CRMI to achieve significant 
improvements even without full agreement from, or enforcement against, non-cooperators.    21 
Similarly, because governments care about the resource stock size, they may support 
programs that establish access rights and management institutions, thereby increasing φ .
15  
Again, the government may be able to achieve most of the resource stock goals with a less 
than perfect CRMI.  For example, to achieve 95 percent of that stock size goal, the 
management institution must have an effectiveness of φ =0.83.  Further, if the government 
wants to focus on protecting clusters further from the village, recognizing perhaps a de facto 
buffer zone closer to the village, the management effectiveness can be low. For example, if 
the government wants to prevent any degradation in cluster 5 even in the transition periods, 
it need only support a management institution with an effectiveness of φ =0.15. 
 
4.2. Spatial variation in the effectiveness of community resource management institutions 
(φ  variable across clusters) 
In many situations, a community resource management institution may function 
reasonably well but not perfectly (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).  For example, the institution 
might be successful at inducing cooperation among villagers but less successful at 
preventing all extraction by outsiders (Heltberg, 2001).  Equally, the institution may be 
more effective closer to the village where extraction behavior is easier to monitor, and less 
effective further from the village where ￿defections￿ are harder to detect. Alternatively, a 
village may not have an effective CRMI for forests near the village but non-local 
government may establish and enforce effective management rules elsewhere, for example 
in a buffer zone between the village and a government-protected area. This section therefore 
explores the spatial pattern of effectiveness of CRMIs on the net present value of resource 
                                                         
15 McCarthy, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2001) develop a model of costly cooperation amongst 
common pool resource users.  If those costs are not covered by an external policy, program, or 
project and are instead born by the CRMI participants, the fixed and variable costs of CRMI 
management can make the optimal level of management lower than that resulting from the sole-
owner￿s optimization.      22 
extraction and the resource stock density. The same calibration is used as for the base 
simulations.  
To demonstrate the impact of varying spatial CRMI effectiveness across the forest 
resource, the specific effectiveness in each cluster is varied whilst the average effectiveness 
across clusters is kept constant. For example, if the CRMI is perfectly effective (φ =1) in the 
three clusters closest to the villagers, and completely ineffective (φ =0) in clusters 4 and 5, 
the average effectiveness of φ  is 0.6 over the five clusters. But, the NPV generated with this 
spatial pattern is equivalent to all clusters 1 through 5 having a CRMI effectiveness of 0.85. 
Conversely, if the CRMI is completely ineffective in clusters 1 and 2, and perfectly 
effective in clusters 3 through 5, also implying an average effectiveness of φ =0.6, the NPV 
corresponds to a CRMI effectiveness in all parcels of only 0.45.  These findings suggest 
that, for example, a community with limited funds should concentrate its management 
efforts closer to the village. In part, these results are driven by the earlier finding that in the 
steady state villagers do not extract from cluster 5 regardless of the degree of effectiveness 
of community resource management institution. Hence varying institutional effectiveness in 
cluster 5 does not affect the equilibrium.  Distance alone protects the resource in cluster 5 
from degradation without potentially expensive property rights enforcement there.  
From a forest manager￿s perspective, focusing management efforts on particular 
clusters can also generate greater overall stock levels than if the effort is even across 
clusters. For example, in the first example above, where institutional effort is concentrated 
in the three clusters closest to the village, the maximum stock size (other than in cluster 5) is 
9.498 (in cluster 4) and the minimum stock size is 5.381 (in cluster 1). In the second 
example, where institutional effort is concentrated further from the village, stocks are lower 
￿ the maximum is 9.048 (in cluster 4) and the minimum 4.041 (in cluster 1).      23 
Consider a third example, proposed in Albers (1998), which suggests that a more 
effective approach to managing forest resources might be to permit a de facto buffer zone in 
the outer peripheries of the forest ￿ where villagers are more inclined to extract and it is 
particularly costly to prevent that extraction, concentrate institutional effort on the center 
clusters (2, 3, and 4) which can be protected from excessive extraction relatively cost 
effectively because distance from the village provides some additional protection, and allow 
distance alone to protect inner cluster 5. With such an institutional arrangement, the 
maximum stock size is 9.865 (in cluster 4)￿higher than in any other configuration of 
CRMI effectiveness considered here including φ =1 in all clusters￿and the minimum stock 
is 3.96 (in cluster 1)￿lower than in all other configurations of CRMI effectiveness 
including φ =0 in all clusters.   
In general, if the CRMI enforces extraction restrictions evenly across all clusters, for 
whatever reason, they will typically do so at a cost in terms of net present value, stock sizes, 
or wasted enforcement. In general, to generate the higher stocks and benefits associated 
with spatially focusing CRMI effectiveness, that focus must not include the clusters farthest 
from the village. This result stems from the fact that distance is costly for villagers and so 
creates natural limits on extraction from far-off clusters, even with open access. Without 
appropriate institutions to internalize the dynamic externality and the over-extraction it 
induces, the relatively lower cost of extracting in nearby clusters encourages more over-
extraction there.  
The framework developed here does not specify a decision maker￿s preferences nor a 
cost of CRMI effectiveness, which would permit further exploration of the optimal 
allocation of CRMI support funds.
16  Yet even without that step, this framework 
                                                         
16 The perspective of a social planner who makes tradeoffs between rural welfare and resource 
stocks with costs of enforcing property rights and management institution rules is the subject of 
current research through further model development and through empirical exploration of    24 
demonstrates the complexity of the tradeoffs involved between generating NPV, 
maintaining high stock sizes, and establishing minimum stock sizes.  In addition, the 
management of one cluster is partially determined by the management of other clusters; the 
spatial costs and the spatial distribution of CRMI effectiveness play a major role in the 
patterns of resource extraction over time and over space. 
Alternative spatial configurations of CRMI effectiveness raise other interesting issues. 
For example, if the property rights are configured φ =1.0, 0.5, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0 for clusters 1 
through 5, the minimum stock observed in cluster 1 is greater than if φ =1.0 for all 5 
clusters because extraction is displaced to cluster 3, where extraction is open access.  
Despite this displacement, cluster 3￿s minimum and maximum stock sizes are higher than if 
φ =0 for all 5 clusters.  That is, when CRMI effectiveness varies spatially, extraction can be 
displaced to the clusters with lower access restrictions but the combination of distance costs 
and CRMI in each cluster determines the impact of that displacement.  
 
5. Discussion 
This paper develops a framework for examining the interaction between the spatial and 
intertemporal aspects of resource extraction and between these extraction patterns and the 
effectiveness of community resource management institutions (CRMI).  The results inform 
a discussion about the importance of the level and location of CRMI activities for protecting 
resources from open access degradation and the lower stock and rural welfare that typically 
result from such over-extraction.   
                                                                                                                                                                              
enforcement and extraction patterns. That line of research addresses the issues of costly property 
rights and requires careful characterization of the spatial and temporal features of those cost 
functions.    25 
First, the spatial-temporal analysis demonstrates that when the location of the resource 
implies a distance cost to extraction, which many empirical studies find to be important, the 
spatial pattern of extraction varies period by period, leading to a multi-period and cyclical 
steady state.  Temporal variation in the spatial pattern of extraction is high across all levels 
and patterns of CRMI effectiveness.  That variation includes periods in which no extraction 
occurs in any cluster of the resource while that resource regenerates.  This temporal 
variation in the spatial pattern of extraction suggests that analyses and policies that are 
based on a single year of observation of extraction behavior may misjudge the situation and 
lead to inappropriate policy statements.  For example, a government seeking to establish a 
buffer zone could underestimate the enforcement needs and the impact on welfare if they 
base their siting and sizing decision on observation of extraction patterns during a year in 
which distant clusters are left to regenerate. 
Second, this analysis demonstrates that the bulk of the losses associated with ￿the 
tragedy of the commons￿ can be avoided with CRMIs that are significantly less effective 
than the benchmark of a sole owner/manager.  Much of the discussion of CRMIs in the 
economics literature focuses on whether institutions can effectively manage resources and, 
if so, what characterizes successful CRMIs. Although not representative of a particular 
setting, the parameter analyses here demonstrate that even if CRMIs are not successful in 
inducing full cooperation of villagers or in completely deterring extraction by outsiders, 
partial effectiveness can generate large welfare and stock size rewards.  This result suggests 
that policies to foster CRMIs to a moderate level of effectiveness may be more important 
than attempting to generate more and more effective CRMIs.  In addition, the analysis here 
suggests that as CRMIs become more effective in a forest, forest stocks will be higher, as 
expected, but the spatial and temporal pattern of extraction and stocks may also change 
markedly.     26 
Third, the cost associated with distance to the extraction site or cluster affords more 
distant clusters some measure of protection from excess extraction and degradation.  Even 
in forests where a CRMI is completely ineffective and open access occurs, extractors allow 
resources in far-off clusters to regenerate to a relatively high stock size before extracting 
there in order to extract enough to cover the fixed cost of distance.  Because the distance 
cost encourages resource regeneration, CRMI effectiveness matters less in those clusters; 
the stock size and net present value of distant clusters do not increase dramatically with 
increases in the CRMI effectiveness.  The spatial-temporal-CRMI effectiveness framework 
shows that the location of CRMI effectiveness contributes at least as much to the protection 
of resources from over-extraction as the average level of the effectiveness of CRMI across 
space.  This result suggests that policy makers, CRMIs, and NGOs can use the spatial cost 
information in siting parks and extraction zones and in allocating typically scarce budget 
resources to enforcement of access restrictions; resource stocks and net present values are 
higher when CRMI effectiveness focuses on clusters closest to the village. 
This paper brings together three related but not integrated lines of research.  The large 
literature on common property, open access, and the role of CRMIs in resource management 
in developing countries rarely addresses temporal or spatial characteristics of the managed 
resources.  Similarly, the growing econometric literature on forest resource extraction 
typically determines that distance generates a cost to extractors but rarely examines the 
interaction of the spatial decision with the property rights regime.  This paper demonstrates 
that these lines of research have much to learn from each other in the pursuit of spatially and 
temporally efficient resource management. 
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Fig. 1. Spatial-temporal extraction patterns and resulting resource densities in the 
forest when φ =1 for all clusters    28 
 
Fig. 2. Spatial-temporal extraction patterns and resulting resource densities in the 
forest when φ =0 for all clusters    29 
 
Fig. 3. summary comparisons of the equilibrium cycles for effective (φ =1) and 
ineffective (φ =0) community management 
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